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39 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION RULES: 
THOUGHTS ON THE CARVING OF 
IMPLEMENTATION SPACE 
Mitchell N. Berman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Let’s start with the obvious: court-announced constitutional 
doctrine is frequently not identical to the announcing court’s 
understanding of what the text of the Constitution means. 
Consider, for example, the doctrine that implements the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. That Clause is terse: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.” But a comprehensive statement of judicial doctrine 
effectuating that command would tax even the most expert First 
Amendment scholar. Here’s just a first and partial stab: 
A law constitutes an impermissible abridgment of the 
freedom of speech if: it regulates expression on the basis of its 
content or viewpoint and is not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest, except that content-based 
regulation of non-misleading speech that proposes a lawful 
economic transaction is permitted if the regulation directly 
advances a substantial government interest that could not be 
advanced equally well by a less speech-restrictive regulation, 
and except too that content-based regulation of speech is 
freely permitted if, inter alia, the regulated speech proposes 
an unlawful economic transaction or a lawful transaction in a 
misleading way, or if it is sexually explicit and as a whole 
appeals to the prurient interest, and depicts or describes 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious 
artistic, political, or scientific value, or if it includes the 
sexually explicit depiction of children, or if the speech, by its 
 
 *  Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, Professor of Philosophy (by courtesy), 
the University of Texas at Austin. I presented an early sketch of this paper at the 2010 
AALS annual meeting, and am grateful to my fellow panelists and to audience members 
for helpful discussions on that occasion, to Rick Garnett for inviting me to participate, 
and to Larry Alexander for his characteristically lucid and productive challenges.  
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very utterance inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace; all subject to the caveat that even when 
speech may permissibly be regulated, if that regulation takes 
the form of a prior restraint on its issuance, then the 
regulation is ordinarily presumptively impermissible; and 
furthermore, a content-neutral regulation of speech is 
impermissible unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
significant government interest and leaves open ample 
alternative channels of communication. 
As complicated as is this statement, it captures, at best, only 
some neighborhoods of constitutional free speech law. I have not 
yet said anything about those portions of the doctrine that 
govern defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
or invasion of privacy, or limited public fora, or campaign 
finance expenditures, or the speech of public employees, and so 
on. 
Even with only a pre-reflective untheorized sense of what 
constitutional meaning is or amounts to, or what are the 
conceptual bounds of the activity of constitutional 
interpretation, it seems exceedingly unlikely that, in contributing 
to the formation of this intricate free-speech doctrine, Supreme 
Court Justices believed that each building block was a partial 
statement of what the First Amendment means, or that all they 
were doing in developing and announcing this doctrine falls 
within the bounds of the activity properly denominated 
interpretation, or that the output itself amounts to an 
interpretation of the First Amendment. In some ways, leading 
scholars have been drawing attention to just this point for 30-odd 
years (think of Henry Monaghan’s work on “constitutional 
common law” and Larry Sager’s on “underenforced 
constitutional norms”).1 But Richard Fallon was particularly 
helpful in focusing attention on it a decade ago when urging that 
what federal courts do in the process of constitutional 
adjudication is more felicitously described under the capacious 
label “constitutional implementation” than as “constitutional 
interpretation.”2 
 
 1. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term—Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1212 (1978). 
 2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
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For a constitutional theorist, especially one of a more 
conceptual orientation, the question raised by this proposed 
change in perspective and vocabulary—from “interpretation” to 
“implementation”—is how best to conceptualize what is going 
on, or what may or should go on, in this implementation space. 
And by conceptualize, I mean how best to think about and 
understand any more or less distinct stages of implementation 
and more or less distinct outputs of the activity. The theorists I 
have mentioned have all carved the space in two: Monaghan 
contrasted “Marbury-shielded constitutional exegesis” with 
“constitutional common law”; Sager distinguished 
“constitutional norms” from “constitutional constructs”; Fallon 
differentiated “constitutional meaning” from “constitutional 
doctrine.” In addition, Kim Roosevelt and I, followed now by 
others, distinguish “constitutional operative propositions” from 
“constitutional decision rules.”3 All these scholars, then, adhere 
to what I have called, in previous work, “the two-output thesis”:4 
each of these frameworks recognizes two conceptually distinct 
outputs of constitutional adjudication (both of which lie 
upstream from the application of law or doctrine to fact that is 
necessary to reach case-specific holdings), one of which is, in a 
fairly straightforward sense, logically and perhaps normatively 
prior to the other. 
It is against this background that we can consider the 
distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional construction introduced a decade ago by Keith 
Whittington5 and embraced and further developed by such other 
 
 3. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What 
the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2006). For a small sampling of other scholarship that has made 
good use of the distinction, including by offering refinements, see David Chang, 
Structuring Constitutional Doctrine: Principles, Proof, and the Functions of Judicial 
Review, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 777 (2006); Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision 
Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659 (2006); Brannon P. Denning, 
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 
(2008); Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 
(2009); Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2010). 
 4. Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 220 (2006). Admittedly, “two outputs” is a bit of a misnomer, for a more 
complete taxonomy of conceptually distinct types of rules that emerge from 
constitutional doctrine would include, at the least, remedial rules, and perhaps others 
too. See Berman, supra note 3, at 12–13. But operative propositions and decision rules 
are the most salient.  
 5. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, 
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prominent “new originalists” as Randy Barnett and Larry 
Solum.6 As Solum puts the distinction: 
Interpretation is “the activity of determining the linguistic 
meaning—or semantic content—of a legal text”; 
Construction is “the activity of translating the semantic 
content of a legal text into legal rules, paradigmatically in 
cases where the meaning of the text is vague.”7 
Constitutional “pragmatists” like Rick Hills who resist the very 
enterprise of carving implementation space into conceptually 
distinct pieces on the grounds that “pragmatically speaking, the 
meaning of a constitutional provision is its implementation,”8 
naturally reject this particular distinction too. But as another 
take on the two-output thesis, the distinction strikes me, at least 
at first blush, as unobjectionable and potentially valuable. I say 
the distinction is unobjectionable “at first blush” and 
“potentially” valuable because, all by itself, it is not very 
informative or helpful.  To distinguish activities occurring in 
implementation space in these terms is not yet, I think, to make 
clear just how this framework differs from previous 
conceptualizations of the two distinct types of general normative 
or propositional outputs of constitutional adjudication.9 Sager 
spoke of “norms” and “constructs.” Is interpretation just the 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]. Of course, the interpretation/construction 
distinction is familiar from other departments of law too, perhaps contract law most 
especially. For an application of the distinction to the constitutional context preceding 
Whittington, see CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1982).  
 6. The label “new originalism” is from Whittington. See Keith E. Whittington, The 
New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004). Its main distinguishing features 
include an explicit focus on textual meaning as opposed to authorial intentions (insofar 
as the two might differ), a justificatory basis “grounded more clearly and firmly in an 
argument about what judges are supposed to be interpreting and what that implies, 
rather than an argument about how best to limit judicial discretion,” id. at 609, and an 
appreciation of the distinction between interpretation and construction. 
 7. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 923, 973 (2009). 
 8. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation 
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006), available at 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/hills.pdf. Perhaps the most influential 
statement of the pragmatic view is Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
 9. This way of structuring the inquiry will strike some readers as misguided from 
the outset, for on one common reading of Whittington, constitutional construction is 
constitutional implementation activity engaged in by the nonjudicial branches, and thus 
that occurs outside of adjudication. Perhaps somewhat simplified: constitutional 
construction : nonjudicial branches :: constitutional interpretation : the judiciary. I 
believe that was never quite Whittington’s view. In any event, it is surely not his present 
view nor that of other scholars who have embraced his vocabulary. 
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name for the process of deriving the norms, with construction 
being the name for the process that results in, well, the 
constructs? Fallon spoke of “meaning” and “doctrine.” 
Plausibly, meaning is the outcome of interpretation. Is doctrine 
just the outcome of construction? 
In order to ascertain whether the interpretation/ 
construction distinction is merely a notational variant of one or 
more other formulations of the two-output thesis, we need to 
hear more. In particular, we need to know: (1) what is linguistic 
meaning or semantic content of the constitutional text; and (2) 
what are the constraints on the translation of the Constitution’s 
semantic content into legal rules—that is, what is the nature of 
such constraints, and what is their content. 
The new originalists provide a reasonably clear answer to 
the first question and at least gesture to or intimate an answer to 
the second, even if what they say on this score is looser than one 
might reasonably wish. Somewhat simplified, and elaborated on 
at greatest length by Solum, the new originalists take the 
semantic content of a legal text to be Gricean sentence meaning, 
which entails that the semantic content of any constitutional 
provision is essentially its original public meaning. Furthermore, 
legal rules, in their view, may permissibly depart from the 
semantic content of the Constitution (understood, more or less, 
as the original public meaning) only in very limited ways. For the 
most part, the activity of construction is proper when the 
semantic content is unable to resolve concrete legal disputes—
because, paradigmatically, it is too vague or otherwise 
underdeterminate. And when construction is called for, its 
proper scope is necessarily and severely restricted—to making a 
vague norm more precise or to choosing between original 
meanings that conflict, or the like.10 
 
 10. Solum, I think, is more openly ambivalent than are most other proponents of 
the interpretation/construction distinction regarding just what should be deemed 
permissible in what he has felicitously dubbed “the construction zone.” He acknowledges 
the possibility that an adherent of the interpretation/construction distinction who adopts 
recognizably originalist views about interpretation might “allow the original meaning to 
be balanced with a variety of other considerations, including precedent, contemporary 
social interests and values, and so forth.” But he does not endorse such a view. 
Moreover, his further observation that, “[c]haracteristically, originalists believe that the 
role of original meaning should be constraining—that is, that absent exceptional 
circumstances (or very weighty reasons), constitutional doctrines that contradict or 
contravene the semantic content of the Constitution (as fixed at the time of origin) are 
illegitimate,” Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary 
Originalist Theory 27 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), might be 
taken to describe a position with which he has considerable sympathy.  
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If one adopts the interpretation/construction distinction 
along the foregoing general lines—interpretation is the activity 
of determining linguistic meaning, and construction is the 
activity of translating linguistic meaning into legal rules—and 
one adopts the new originalist views of linguistic meaning and of 
the strictures that such linguistic meaning puts on the process of 
construction or translation (whatever, precisely, those strictures 
turn out to be), then one has tools of consequence. One armed 
with this whole package is apt to make different moves in the 
practice of constitutional implementation, and reach different 
destinations, than one not so armed. The question, accordingly, 
is whether one should adopt this package of views. Very 
generally, that is what I mean to explore in this essay. 
More precisely, I aim to address three distinct but related 
questions. First, are the originalist views I have just sketched 
about linguistic meaning and about the permissible scope of 
construction true? Second, if originalist views about the 
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text and the constraints 
that that meaning imposes on the announcement of law and the 
generation of legal doctrine are not jointly true, does the 
interpretation/construction distinction, as glossed by its 
proponents, still have value? That is, is its utility independent of 
particular controversial claims about linguistic meaning and the 
permissible relationship between linguistic meaning and legal 
doctrine? Third, if the interpretation/construction distinction is 
not useful when divested of originalist content, are the 
pragmatists right that the taxonomic project is fundamentally 
mistaken? That is, do our reasons for finding the 
interpretation/construction distinction unhelpful or 
unilluminating tell as well against the more general effort to 
conceptualize distinct steps or outputs of constitutional 
implementation? 
Before we can profitably assess these questions, however, it 
will serve us well to gain clarity on a potential ambiguity at the 
 
It has never been entirely clear to me, however, just what this “non-contravention 
principle” (as we may call it) amounts to. Barnett, for example, insists in a representative 
passage that constitutional construction must remain “within the bounds established by 
original meaning,” RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 121 (2004). But the paradigmatic construction translates a 
standard-like original meaning into more rule-like doctrinal form. And it is a common 
and generally accepted feature of rules that they will prove over- and under-inclusive 
relative to the standard to which they correspond or that they serve to enforce or 
effectuate. It is therefore far from self-evident what determines whether a construction 
does or does not stay within the bounds established by original meaning. 
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heart of the interpretation/construction distinction. And before 
we can resolve that ambiguity, we must specify just what the 
ambiguity is, and that will take a little effort. Briefly, though, the 
question goes like this. One who has not already embraced the 
interpretation/construction distinction might be disposed to 
subdivide constitutional implementation into three pieces or 
activities, not two: (1) the activity of determining the semantic 
content of a legal text; (2) the activity of determining the legal 
content of a legal text—or of determining “what the law is”; and 
(3) the activity of translating the text’s legal content into (other) 
legal rules that are more easily or cheaply administered, that 
threaten less overdeterrence, or that are, in any other fashion 
plausibly thought legitimate, better suited to judicial 
enforcement. While not yet contending that this is a particularly 
good way to conceptualize implementation space, I believe that 
some intuitive sense can be made of this three-part distinction. If 
so, and insofar as we are trying to evaluate the more austere 
interpretation/construction framework, we need to know how to 
map this trichotomy onto the dichotomy. 
In particular, we need to know how the interpretation/ 
construction distinction might be massaged, revised or 
reconstrued to accommodate the possibility that what the law is 
need not be identical to what the (fixed) semantic meaning of a 
legal text is. Because the most prominent proponents of the 
interpretation/construction distinction also believe (possibly 
subject to an exception for judicial precedent) that the legal 
content of a text just is its semantic content, conceived in 
originalist fashion, they have not, I believe, said much or perhaps 
anything about what interpretation, in contradistinction to 
construction, is intended to cover in the event (counterfactual 
though they believe it to be) that a text’s legal content and its 
linguistic content can be non-identical. Their silence on this 
question notwithstanding, it seems to me that there are only 
three realistic possibilities. 
First, they could steadfastly deny the possible non-identity 
of linguistic and legal content by insisting that legal 
interpretation just is the activity of trying to ascertain a legal 
text’s legal content and its linguistic content, which are one and 
the same. To take this approach is to concede that the value or 
utility of the interpretation/construction distinction depends 
entirely on certain contested views about what the law is, and 
has no more general conceptual or theoretical value. This is the 
all-or-nothing strategy. 
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A second possibility treats interpretation as the central 
activity and construction as the remainder (that is, everything 
that isn’t interpretation is construction), and sticks with the 
definition quoted above: interpretation is the activity of trying to 
discover linguistic content. If, in accord with the possibility we 
are now entertaining, legal content can be other than linguistic 
content, then to engage in “interpretation” is not to engage in 
the activity of “determining what the law is,” and it follows that 
part of what goes on in the space of “construction” is not only 
doing things with or to existing legal norms, but discovering what 
those existing legal norms are. 
The third possibility, like the second, treats construction as 
that which isn’t interpretation, but it redefines interpretation to 
make central what the definitions quoted above omit entirely—
namely, that legal interpretation is a search for legal content, or 
for “what the law is,” and is not the activity of searching merely 
for (fixed) linguistic content if non-originalist views about what 
the law is are correct. On this account, just as constitutional 
implementation can be divided into the two stages of 
interpretation and construction, constitutional interpretation 
itself can be further subdivided in two: semantic or linguistic 
interpretation, and legal interpretation. 
Part I elaborates on this critical threshold problem of 
understanding where in the interpretation/construction 
framework law resides. It concludes that most proponents of the 
interpretation/construction distinction likely mean to advance 
the compound thesis that interpretation is the search for legal 
content, that legal content is linguistic content, and that linguistic 
content is fixed. Part II, accordingly, assesses this claim. 
Naturally, a full-scale critical evaluation is impossible in this 
short space. That said, it offers a hypothetical designed to pump 
the intuition that the very restrictive originalist view about the 
content of constitutional law is mistaken: even putting judicial 
precedent aside, law is not always the fixed semantic content of a 
legal text.11 
Part III then turns to the second rendering of the 
interpretation/construction distinction—one in which inter-
pretation is the activity of determining a text’s linguistic content 
even insofar as linguistic content merely contributes to, but does 
 
 11. This is uninterestingly true of law that is not even purported to be the 
interpretation of a legal text, like traditional common law. I am speaking of law that is 
claimed to have a textual basis.  
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not determine, what the law is. This Part argues that a two-part 
divide between linguistic interpretation on the one hand and 
everything else that goes on in law-discovery and doctrine-
making on the other is not useful or illuminating. Lastly, Part IV 
considers the third possibility—that interpretation is the 
determination of what the law is, while construction is the 
activity of creating doctrine adjacent to, distinct from, or 
supplementary of, what the law is. Pragmatists think such an 
account nonsensical and therefore urge that we abandon the 
taxonomic project. Part IV rejects that conclusion. It argues that 
this conceptualization of implementation space is familiar and 
useful—it reflects the “decision rules” perspective, for 
example—at least so long as we foreground interpretation as the 
activity of determining what the law is and background the 
activity of determining what a text’s fixed linguistic content is. 
In short, I argue: that an originalist view of constitutional 
implementation that invokes or builds upon the distinction 
between interpretation and construction is false; that the 
interpretation/construction distinction as presently formulated 
(interpretation is the activity of determining linguistic meaning) 
is not likely to be useful when it is divested of its objectionable 
originalist claims regarding the content of law; and that there is 
another way to carve judicial implementation of the Constitution 
into two pieces that is illuminating and useful. 
I. INTERPRETATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND LAW 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department,” Chief Justice Marshall declared in Marbury, “to 
say what the law is.”12 How does a judge (or anybody else, for 
that matter) determine what the law is? A first pass at an answer 
might invoke the concept, or at least the language, of 
“interpretation.” We might say, for instance: that judges must 
interpret legal texts to determine what the law is; that the point 
or function or purpose of legal interpretation is to ascertain what 
the law is; that the law is what authoritative legal texts, properly 
interpreted, provide or direct. Statements like these could be 
mistaken or misleading, but they are familiar and seem plausible 
on their face. 
If this is right, then the target of legal interpretation is “legal 
meaning” or “legal content” or “law.” We should not start by 
 
 12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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assuming that the target is “linguistic meaning” or “semantic 
content” even though it would turn out that way if “what the law 
is” is necessarily identical to the semantic meaning of the 
relevant legal texts. Now, originalists, or many of them, maintain 
that it does turn out that way.  But what if they’re wrong about 
that? If linguistic meaning and legal meaning come apart, which 
type of meaning does interpretation target? Of course, we could 
resolve this question easily enough by distinguishing between 
linguistic interpretation and legal interpretation. But the 
interpretation/construction distinction does not adopt that 
solution; it speaks of interpretation, simpliciter.  So the question 
remains: what does interpretation track or target if a text’s legal 
content or legal effect—its contribution to the law—is not its 
(fixed) linguistic content? 
An illustration will make both the question itself, and its 
importance, clearer. Imagine a photographer or media outlet 
raising the First Amendment as a defense to prosecution under a 
federal statute that makes it a crime to publish photos of war 
dead or their grieving families. Call the case Jones.13  Assuming 
away any governing judicial precedent, the reviewing court in 
Jones will ask itself such questions as “does a ban on news 
photography violate the guarantee of ‘freedom of speech’?” and 
“what does ‘freedom of speech’ mean?” And in resolving these 
questions, the court may well engage in the customary modalities 
of constitutional argument—textual, historical, purposive, 
ethical, and the like. 
Suppose that the court is persuaded that the original public 
meaning of “freedom of speech,” even understood as a possible 
legal term of art, was limited to the freedom to engage in 
activities that employ words for the purpose of communication—
namely, speaking and writing. On this view, a ban on the display 
or publication of photographs cannot constitute a forbidden 
abridgement of “the freedom of speech,” if that phrase is 
construed or understood in accordance with its original public 
meaning. But, let us continue to suppose, the court is not yet 
persuaded that this narrow original public meaning sets forth the 
(legal) “meaning” of the First Amendment, or establishes “what 
the law is.” Instead, the court concludes that the fundamental 
purposes behind the free speech guarantee extend to cover at 
least some non-linguistic and non-speech forms of 
 
 13. Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (holding that motion 
pictures are entitled to First Amendment protection). 
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communication or expressive activity. Had the framers and 
ratifiers thought about things like representational art, and had 
they known about photography, the court believes to a high 
degree of confidence, they would have wanted to extend 
constitutional protection against government interference with 
these things too.14 Accordingly, the court answers the questions 
posed above like this (more or less): a ban on news photography 
does violate the constitutional guarantee of “freedom of 
speech,” and the constitutional prohibition on abridgements of 
the freedom of speech means that the government may not 
restrict people’s natural right to engage in expressive activity 
unreasonably or arbitrarily. 
I am not urging that this would be the “right” or “best” 
interpretation on the stated facts. I ask you only to assume that 
the judges involved in Jones take themselves to be engaged in 
“constitutional interpretation,” that they are trying, consistent 
with Marbury, to ascertain “what the law is,” and that part of 
their answer is that the law is non-identical, in this case, to what 
the original public meaning of the relevant constitutional 
provision was. 
Now imagine a second law, enacted after Jones, that makes 
it a crime to publish sexually explicit photographs of any foreign 
dignitary. The law is challenged and, in a case called Smith, the 
Court announces the following doctrine: The distribution or sale, 
but not the mere possession, of photographic material may be 
regulated if (a) the material depicts sexually explicit conduct; (b) 
the sexually explicit depiction does not significantly advance a 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value or purpose; 
(c) regulation of the material serves a compelling government 
interest unrelated to the preservation of existing social mores or 
protecting viewers of the material from offense; and (d) the 
government could not achieve its compelling interest in a 
manner less restrictive of photographic expression.15 
 
 14. Don’t make the mistake of thinking that, if the framers or ratifiers, if polled, 
would have agreed that the First Amendment should protect non-vocal communicative 
activities, then the original linguistic meaning of “freedom of speech” must not have been 
limited to linguistic communication, as I have asked us to assume. A shop owner who 
posts a sign announcing “no dogs allowed” might agree that her purpose is better served 
by also excluding, rather than by admitting, your pet tiger. She might even argue that that 
is how her sign “should be interpreted.” But that wouldn’t entail that the “linguistic 
meaning” of “dogs” includes tigers, or that the original meaning of the utterance “no 
dogs allowed” includes a prohibition on tigers.  
 15. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (setting forth the familiar three-part 
test for obscenity). 
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If we are not already wedded to a particular conceptual 
framework, we might reasonably suppose—pre-theoretically, if 
need be—that Jones and Smith centrally involve different types 
of judicial activity. Outside observers and the judges themselves 
might say that the court in Jones was trying to interpret the First 
Amendment; that there is a meaningful sense in which the First 
Amendment protected photography against government 
censorship even before Jones was decided; that Jones was 
declarative of the law. Smith, we might say, was different, for it is 
much harder to swallow that the four-part Smith test preexisted 
that decision much as, in Michelangelo’s estimation, his David 
already existed in the block of marble from which he carved it. 
The rule that emerged from Smith was, it would seem, created or 
constructed in a way that the rule that emerged from Jones was 
not. Significantly, this is not merely a post hoc judgment, for the 
winning briefs in the two cases are likely to read very differently. 
Whereas the Jones defendants argued, we can reasonably 
imagine, that “the First Amendment, properly interpreted, 
protects photography from state censorship,” no party or amicus 
in Smith would have argued similarly that the Constitution, 
“properly interpreted,” provides that a ban on the distribution 
sexually explicit is constitutionally permissible if or only if the 
four conditions stated above are satisfied. Had any brief 
proposed the test that the Smith Court ended up announcing, or 
some close variant thereof, its arguments would have been 
couched in terms of what the court should do, and not in terms 
of what the law, rightly understood, already was. 
If this is roughly correct as a description of how the judges 
and many (but not all) observers would understand what has 
happened in these two cases, we can provisionally identify three 
different activities within, and three different outputs of, 
constitutional adjudication: (1) a judicial determination 
regarding what the original public meaning of the Free Speech 
Clause was; (2) a judicial determination regarding what the Free 
Speech Clause “does,” or “means” or “provides” or “covers,” or 
regarding what its legal effect is, or what the law is; and (3) a 
judicial crafting or formulation of a test or doctrine to implement 
or administer the First Amendment—which is to say, to 
administer the First Amendment’s “command” or its legal 
meaning. In order to assess the interpretation/construction 
framework, we need to specify how it accommodates this 
tripartite picture of constitutional implementation. 
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On one reading of the relevant literature, what the law is at 
a given moment of time—say, the moment at which a case is 
submitted to a judge for decision—is a function of both 
interpretation and construction. As Solum observes: “All or 
almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of the 
Constitution should make a substantial contribution to the 
content of constitutional doctrine.”16 If we read “constitutional 
doctrine” as roughly synonymous with “constitutional law,” then 
we might reasonably conclude that originalists do not, or need 
not, reduce constitutional law to the semantic content of the 
constitutional text. 
Of course, constitutional law is not reducible to the 
semantic content of the constitutional text in one important 
respect. Judicial decisions (especially decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court) can announce, set forth, or make law that is 
supreme over other sources of law and thus is fairly described as 
“constitutional law” even when their decisions announce norms, 
under the aegis of the Constitution, that are inconsistent with the 
text’s semantic content, conceived in an originalist vein or 
otherwise. And while originalists famously disagree amongst 
themselves regarding the permissibility of continued judicial 
adherence to judicial precedents that depart from original 
meaning, few or none deny that the nonoriginalist judicial 
decision is not constitutional law. But let’s put the issue of 
judicial precedents aside, not because it is unimportant but 
because it introduces extraordinary complexity. 
The reading of construction that I am floating right now 
seems to allow for the possibility that, even if there is no judicial 
precedent on point, our supreme law—the law that we 
conventionally classify as “constitutional”—might not be a 
function of semantic content alone. Factors or considerations 
such as “contemporary social interests and values” might also 
contribute (in some fashion as yet unspecified) to the content of 
the law—contribute, that is, to what the law is even before the 
courts say anything about it. On this view, a judge might 
interpret a constitutional provision to determine that its original 
public meaning was M, and then might somehow mix or combine 
that meaning with, or (better) weigh or balance that meaning 
against, contemporary values or understandings in an activity 
denominated “construction” to determine that the law is N.17 
 
 16. Solum, supra note 10, at 27. 
 17. Compare Randy Barnett’s observation that “for those nonoriginalists for whom 
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That is one reading of how construction can work. But it is 
not, I think, the more likely reading. On a second reading, 
construction refers to an activity that judges perform on the law 
to make it work better (by their lights) in adjudicating cases. 
Again assume away any intervening judicial precedent, and 
suppose that the semantic meaning of some provision P is M. On 
the new originalist construal of semantic meaning of a legal text, 
that means that the original public meaning of P was M. Maybe 
M is too vague to provide much guidance in the resolution of 
disputes. Suppose P is the Equal Protection Clause, and M was 
“the states must treat likes alike absent very good reason.” A 
correct interpretation would conclude that that’s the law: the law 
is (to a first approximation) that a state statute or regulation that 
purports to treat persons differently on grounds that are not 
supported by very good reason is legally void. But a new 
originalist might acknowledge that that legal norm is 
insufficiently precise or determinate to serve rule of law values: 
citizens and governmental actors will have difficulty predicting 
how it will apply in individual cases, thus inviting frequent 
litigation, which litigation will be resolved in non-uniform ways, 
and so forth. So she might permit courts to craft implementing 
rules in the exercise of constitutional construction. The tiers of 
scrutiny might, accordingly, be perfectly permissible 
constitutional doctrine. But this doctrine refines, augments, or 
supplements what the law was or is. 
Note that while the first reading of the interpretation/ 
construction distinction (pursuant to which construction can be a 
second step in law-determination) accepts our provisional 
characterization of Jones as determining what the law is, this 
second reading rejects that characterization. It maintains that 
steps (2) and (3) presented above both occur downstream from 
law-determination. The law, on this account, just is what the 
original public meaning of the Free Speech Clause was. And 
whether steps (2) and (3) are kosher is a normative, not a 
 
original meaning provides a starting point or ‘modality’ of constitution interpretation, it 
nevertheless remains important to get that original meaning correct before moving on to 
other modalities or to ‘translate’ original meaning into today’s application.” Randy E. 
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). I 
doubt that most nonoriginalists would speak of translating original meaning into today’s 
“application”—indeed, I confess not to being entirely sure just what idea Barnett means 
to attribute here to nonoriginalists. Most nonoriginalists, I suspect, would describe 
themselves as consulting other argumentative modalities in an effort to determine what 
the constitution means or provides, or what the law is. 
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conceptual, question; the answers depend upon judgments about 
what it is legitimate or permissible for judges to do as a matter of 
political morality. We never engage in construction to determine 
what the law is; construction concerns only “what we might want 
to do or have done with” the law.18 
By and large, I believe that contemporary proponents of the 
interpretation/construction distinction—theorists who are, after 
all, self-described originalists—adopt this latter position. That is, 
when they define constitutional interpretation as the “process of 
discovering the meaning of the constitutional text,”19 the 
“meaning” they have in mind is, all at once, legal, linguistic, and 
fixed.  (Take this claim about how most advocates of the 
distinction would respond to the choice I’m presenting them 
with a grain of salt. Nothing in this essay depends upon whether 
this empirical generalization or prediction is accurate.) The next 
Part argues against this view by buttressing the judgment that 
the content of the law is determined by more than its semantic 
meaning if semantic meaning is some form of original meaning, 
that is, if the legal meaning is fixed. In Part III I pursue the 
possibility of construing the interpretation/construction 
distinction in the first way. That is, I ask whether this particular 
conceptualization of constitutional implementation is useful if 
we allow that some of what judges do in the process of 
determining what the law is falls on the construction side of the 
divide. 
II. LAW AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
We are assuming now that interpretation is the activity of 
trying to determine, from legal sources, what the law is, and also 
that—putting aside complexities created by a long history of 
judicial precedents that surely themselves contribute, in diverse 
ways, to the content of constitutional law—constitutional law 
just is the original public meaning of the constitutional text. I 
have elsewhere argued at length that the originalists’ varied 
arguments for this proposition are unpersuasive or worse.20 I do 
not wish merely to repeat myself and, in any event, lack space 
for a full-blown argument. So I will not attempt to provide here 
 
 18. Whittington, supra note 6, at 611. The sentence from which I am quoting reads: 
“Although originalism may indicate how the constitutional text should be interpreted, it 
does not exhaust what we might want to do and have done with that text.” I believe that 
the use I am making of this passage is faithful to Whittington’s intent, but am not certain. 
 19. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 5. 
 20. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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anything close to a decisive refutation of this thesis. Instead, I 
offer a story that might suggest, at least to the uncommitted, that 
the reduction of the legal meaning or legal content to fixed 
semantic content is not tenable. 
Suppose that tomorrow we discover, or conclude, that the 
word protection had a significant role to play in the original 
public meaning of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 
Suppose, in other words, that the original public meaning of the 
constitutional dictate that “no state shall deny to any person the 
equal protection of the laws” was, to a first approximation, that 
no state shall unreasonably or unfairly discriminate in the 
provision of the protection that the law furnishes individual 
people, and that “protection” here means things like police and 
fire services and judicial rules and procedures for vindicating 
rights.21 
Of course, now-existing judge-made or judge-announced 
constitutional doctrine provides that discrimination in any sort of 
governmental activity—including in the provision of constitu-
tionally gratuitous benefits—can violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. Whether a particular discrimination in the provision of 
benefits will be held to violate the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection will depend upon the outcome of an analysis 
demanded by the appropriate tier of judicial scrutiny—as a rule 
of thumb, a discrimination on the basis of race or gender is 
exceedingly likely to be held unconstitutional; discrimination on 
most other bases is likely to survive. The critical point, however, 
is that discrimination in the provision of benefits will be held a 
denial of the constitutional guarantee of “equal protection” if 
that discrimination is adjudged unequal. This would not be so 
under what we are imagining was the original meaning of that 
Clause, pursuant to which state action amounts to a denial of 
equal protection only if two conditions are satisfied: the state 
action is unequal and involves protection. Simply put, 
“protection” as a significant idea has fallen out of present-day 
understanding of the constitutional equality command. 
Here’s one question that might be asked of this state of 
affairs: is it or is it not a correct statement of the law today that 
discrimination in the provision of benefits may violate the 
 
 21. John Harrison has put forth a view about the original meaning of the Clause 
along these lines, see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1433–51 (1992), though nothing in my argument depends upon his 
claims being historically accurate. 
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Fourteenth Amendment?22 One might be tempted to guess that 
originalists and nonoriginalists answer this question differently—
that originalists say that it is not the law, while nonoriginalists 
say that it is. But, as I have already suggested, this answer is 
almost certainly mistaken. While originalists famously disagree 
about whether judges have a legal or constitutional or moral 
duty to overrule precedents that, viewed through an originalist 
lens, are incorrect,23 they generally agree that, unless and until 
the judiciary does overrule a mistaken precedent, that precedent 
sets forth the law. 
So let us change the hypothetical just this bit. Assume that 
there have been no Supreme Court precedents holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause has any application to supposed 
inequalities not involving discrimination in the provision of 
protection. But assume that this aspect of our actual world 
remains true: “protection” as a significant idea has nonetheless 
fallen out of present-day understanding of the constitutional 
equality command. Notwithstanding no Supreme Court holdings 
on point, nobody believes that the Equal Protection Clause is 
limited to prohibiting unequal protections. Indeed, there have 
been no Supreme Court holdings on point precisely because of 
this widespread understanding. Whenever a legislator, state or 
national, proposes legislation that would unfairly discriminate in 
the provision of benefits, an overwhelming majority of 
participants to the debate—citizens and elected officials alike—
object that it would be unconstitutional. And the defenders of 
the legislation invariably respond by arguing that the 
discrimination would not be unfair or unreasonable, and never 
by denying that the Equal Protection Clause would prohibit the 
legislation if the discrimination were unfair or unreasonable. 
Let us go further. Assume that state courts, when enforcing 
state equality provisions with language similar to the federal 
Equal Protection Clause routinely interpret the state provisions 
to apply to the provision of benefits, universally and 
unequivocally rejecting the rare suggestion that the federal 
guarantee is concerned only with unequal protection. And this: 
dicta in several Supreme Court decisions makes clear the 
 
 22. Put aside the possibility, also urged by Harrison, see id., that the original public 
meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was such as to prohibit many of the 
inequalities that existing doctrine locates within, or attributes to, the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
 23. For citations to some of the literature, along with comments on the difficulty 
that a negative answer creates for originalists, see Berman, supra note 20, at 33–37. 
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Justices’ view that the Clause is not limited to legislation that 
involves “protection.” For example, in cases denying plaintiffs 
standing to challenge some legislation, Justices have conveyed, 
gratuitously but without contradiction, the broader 
understanding of the constitutional command. And finally this: 
some many years ago, in response to the suggestion by a 
historian that the original public meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause was limited to “protection,” and thus does not 
prohibit even the grossest inequalities in the provision of 
benefits, a campaign began to amend the Constitution to add an 
equality provision that would explicitly have broader scope. But 
this campaign went nowhere in the face of near-universal 
agreement that it was unnecessary. 
Given all these facts, what is the law? Does the law prohibit 
inequalities that do not involve the provision of services and 
procedures fairly denominated “protection”? It seems to me that 
originalists are committed to answering that question in the 
negative: the law is just what some fixed original feature of the 
Constitution (paradigmatically, its original public meaning) 
provides, and the widespread understanding that the 
Constitution offers broader protection against unequal state 
action is nothing other than a mistake.24 It is a mistake not only 
about what the original meaning was, but also, and more to the 
present point, a mistake about what the law is. 
This answer strikes me as rather plainly wrong, resting on a 
sterile and bizarrely asocial conception of what law is. In 
dismissing as immaterial what members of a socio-legal system 
(a system not reducible, mind you, to what happens in court) 
take to be the law and how their understanding is causally 
efficacious for them, it treats municipal law as not meaningfully 
different from scientific law. But municipal law is different. As 
Brian Bix has emphasized, “legal discourse purports to describe 
a practice and a product that is, by most accounts, a social fact 
that has little or no existence outside the actions and intentions 
of its participants.”25 Therefore, under a more accurate 
 
 24. This is painting a little broadly. I suppose that an originalist might answer that 
the law does prohibit inequalities that do not involve protection, but that such law is not 
“constitutional.” This will not be an easy position to maintain, and it might generate 
conclusions at odds with some of the originalist’s other commitments, including 
commitments (about the only legitimate limitations on legislative action) that help 
motivate his or her originalism in the first place. But I cannot adequately explore here 
how this argumentative line might be developed. I am happy to offer this route as an 
olive branch to my originalist opponents.  
 25. Brian H. Bix, Global Error and Legal Truth, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 
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conception, as Gerald Postema said of the classical common law 
understanding, “law in its fundament [is] not so much ‘made’ or 
‘posited’—something ‘laid down’ by will or nature—but rather 
something ‘taken up,’ that is, used by judges and others in . . . 
practical deliberation.”26 
As intimated above, I will not try to develop decisive 
arguments to persuade you of this conclusion if what strikes me 
as rather clear strikes you rather differently. Let me, however, 
offer one variation on the story. 
Turn attention away from a hypothetical presentation of our 
polity and legal culture to some ancient civilization. Call it 
Etrusca. Suppose that the Etruscans had legal texts, but little 
adjudication, for the citizens generally agreed on what their legal 
obligations are and also preferred to resolve what disagreements 
remained informally—informally but, necessarily, in the shadow 
of formal legal resolution. An authoritative Etruscan legal text, 
authored in 800 B.C.E., contained provision P. For roughly 500 
years, starting around 700 B.C.E., ordinary Etruscans and 
members of the legislative and executive branches 
overwhelmingly understood P to mean M. That is, they 
understood the law to be M in virtue of P. So too did judges 
(perhaps if only in their unofficial capacities), though they had 
 
538 (2009). From this premise, Bix argues, correctly in my view, against the claim that a 
longstanding consensus in a community regarding what the law is can be mistaken. As he 
puts it, “long-term consensus is itself ‘truth-making’ for parts of law the way that it is for 
(most parts of) language.” Id. at 540. But Bix also allows, tentatively, that claims of 
global legal error regarding the interpretation of authoritative texts, like the U.S. 
Constitution, could possibly be correct. Id. at 543. Bix is certainly right that there could 
be global error about such things as what the original public meaning of a constitutional 
provision was or what various historical persons intended for it to accomplish, or the like. 
Insofar as he is claiming that everyone in a society could be mistaken about the legal 
interpretation of legal texts, I am not certain that he is right. (It might be supposed that, 
on certain facts, the Hartian account of law would support Bix’s view here. If the Rule of 
Recognition provides, say, that the law is the original public meaning of certain texts, and 
if the original public meaning of a text, thus picked out, were Q, but everybody believed 
that the law, derived from the text, were P, it might seem to follow that everybody is 
mistaken. But this is not obviously so. It might be said, in response to such an assumed 
case, either that the fact of this stable and global misunderstanding establishes that our 
account of the Rule of Recognition in the society must be revised, or: so much the worse 
for the Hartian account of law.) 
In any event, I do not understand Bix to be defending the proposition that, in cases 
like my hypothetical, all the law subjects (and all living lawmakers) would in fact be in 
error about what the law is. He is mooting a theoretical possibility, not maintaining that 
this would be the more probable conclusion, and I believe that the logic of his general 
position strongly suggests that it would not be. (I am grateful to Bix for helpful exchanges 
about his views.)  
 26. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD 
U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 166 (2002). 
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no occasion to so rule. Imagine that a modern-day historian 
determines, to the satisfaction of all historians of the period, that 
the original public meaning of P was N, not M. Was the law in 
Etrusca from 700-200 B.C.E. M or N? Could it possibly be that 
the law was N even though not a soul alive at the time believed 
the law to be N or acted in accordance with such a belief? If not, 
it seems to follow that it is not the case that the legal content or 
legal meaning of a text—the law that is associated with it, or that 
it (partially) determines—is necessarily the original semantic 
content of the text. 
III. INTERPRETATION—LINGUISTIC, NOT LEGAL 
If a robust originalist take on the interpretation/ 
construction distinction is not viable, let us now consider the first 
possible clarification of the interpretation/construction 
distinction floated in Part I. That construal, recall, sticks to the 
idea that interpretation is the determination of a text’s linguistic 
content while allowing that linguistic content and legal content—
what the law is—might differ. On this view, once the judge has 
determined the (fixed) linguistic meaning of a constitutional 
provision, she leaves interpretation and enters the realm of 
construction even if, as will sometimes be the case, she hasn’t yet 
determined what the law is. This picture consists of the following 
three steps: 
1. constitutional interpretation—the activity of 
determining the Constitution’s (fixed) linguistic 
meaning; 
2. law-determining constitutional construction—the 
activity of determining, based on the Constitution’s 
linguistic meaning and other considerations, what 
the law is; and 
3. doctrine-creating constitutional construction—the 
activity of formulating legal tests or rules designed 
to better administer the constitutional law (as 
determined, perhaps implicitly, at step 2). 
We might ask whether this account presents a “true” or 
“accurate” picture of constitutional implementation. But I’d ask 
a different question—namely, whether this picture is useful or 
illuminating. That, I think, is the better standard for adjudging 
proffered conceptualizations of most phenomena, including of 
constitutional adjudication. And the answer, I think, is no. 
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To see why, it is helpful to measure this conceptualization 
against an alternative account. And the most common 
alternative account, sometimes dubbed “pluralist”27 or 
“eclectic,”28 views constitutional law as the output of 
constitutional interpretation, and constitutional interpretation as 
the practice-constrained application of the (Bobbittian) 
modalities of constitutional argument: original meaning of the 
text, framers’ and ratifiers’ purposes, historical practice, judicial 
precedent, structural implications, consequences, justice, and the 
like.29 Nobody denies that fixed linguistic meaning is an 
important consideration in the determination of the 
Constitution’s legal meaning. What many do deny, though, is 
that it has uniquely privileged status. And if it does not, then it is 
misleading or distracting to assign a particular label—and the 
label “interpretation” at that!—to what is only one among the 
several arguments or considerations that, in appropriate cases, 
contribute to the Constitution’s legal meaning. To be sure, we 
might want a special word for the inquiry into fixed semantic 
meaning if fixed semantic meaning firmly constrained legal 
meaning. But the equal protection hypothetical is intended to 
demonstrate that that is not so.30 
Judges should inquire into many things en route to a 
determination of what is the Constitution’s legal effect, content, 
or significance—or what the Constitution, as law, has to say 
about a particular dispute or problem. Because one of the many 
things they should inquire into—often, a very important thing—
is the original meaning of some portion of the constitutional text, 
it is not mistaken to say that there exists an “activity of 
determining the Constitution’s (fixed) linguistic meaning.” But 
there also exist the “activities,” say, of determining the purposes 
that some portion of the text, or the text viewed as an integrated 
whole, was meant to accomplish, and of determining what has 
 
 27. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. 
L. REV. 1753 (1994). 
 28. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997). 
 29. The modalities mentioned in the text are familiar but go beyond those that 
Bobbitt himself articulated. See PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
 30. Elsewhere, I have discussed another case in which many observers will agree 
that fixed semantic meaning need not constrain legal meaning, or what the law is. See 
Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons from 
John McCain and the Natural Born Citizen Clause (Univ. of Tex. Law, Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 157, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1458108. 
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been the post-enactment understanding of the constitutional 
command.  If this is so—and I grant that I have invoked a 
widespread understanding that it is so rather than having 
advanced an argument designed to persuade the skeptics31—then 
there is no good reason to affix a special name to the first 
activity, let alone to favor it with the title “interpretation.” 
IV. CONSTRUCTING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION 
RULES 
The upshot of the analysis in Part III was to question the 
utility of the interpretation/construction distinction when cashed 
out as a division between the activities of, on the one hand, 
discovering semantic meaning and, on the other, doing 
everything else involved in determining and refining the law and 
constructing implementing legal doctrine. Does it follow that the 
conceptual enterprise is misguided? 
Before concluding that it is, we should consider an 
alternative construal of the interpretation/construction 
distinction that its present proponents seem not to favor, but 
that emerges naturally enough from our previous discussion. If 
we distinguish the (fixed) semantic or linguistic meaning or 
content of a legal text from its (possibly dynamic) legal 
meaning,32 effect or significance, we might conclude that legal 
interpretation is the effort to determine the latter, not the 
former–insofar as the two differ in a particular case. This allows 
us to maintain a two-part distinction where judges interpret what 
the law is and also make doctrines to administer, enforce, or 
implement the law. Moreover, we might wish to assign the label 
“construction” to the latter set of activities. If we do, we are left 
with the rudiments of an interpretation/construction distinction 
that, when fleshed out in a particular way, is, I think, both 
illuminating and helpful—although not the one that originalists 
(“new” or otherwise) have in mind. I will say a little about that 
 
 31. For somewhat more argument in support of my general view of law is an 
argumentative practice and of legal norms as constituted by the actual legal reasoning of 
participants acting in accordance with practice-constrained norms of argumentation, see 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Theory and the Rule of Recognition: Toward a Fourth 
Theory of Law, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 269–94 
(Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
 32. Notice that I have consistently treated linguistic content and semantic meaning 
as necessarily fixed. Perhaps someone will want to distinguish linguistic content from 
legal content while allowing that the former can change, even without reauthorings (and, 
therefore, that so too can the latter). This does not strike me as a promising line of 
argument, but I’ll withhold further comment until I see it sketched out. 
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alternative conception of the interpretation/construction 
distinction in this final Part. But we may be better positioned to 
understand that alternative conception—the “decision rules” 
model—after we first consider the pragmatists’ objection. 
The pragmatist objection to carving the realm of 
constitutional implementation into conceptually distinguishable 
components has been forcefully expressed by Rick Hills. As I 
read him, Hills is advancing two interwoven but distinct 
complaints. First, to cleave constitutional “meaning” (or some 
similar such thing) from implementing doctrine is to multiply 
categories without point or profit.  “Pragmatically speaking,” he 
insists, “the meaning of a constitutional provision is its 
implementation. To talk of some ‘pure’ constitutional principle 
independent of how some institution—the courts, the Congress, 
the President, the mob, law professors, and so forth—
implements that value is to talk in empty metaphysical 
abstractions.”33 Or, as Daryl Levinson had argued some years 
earlier, “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their 
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very 
existence.”34 Worse, to mark something like a meaning/doctrine 
distinction is not merely pointless but false and possibly harmful. 
The classificatory or taxonomic impulse, says Hills, is committed 
to the existence of a “Snark of ‘pure’ noninstrumental 
constitutional value,” yet such a thing, he thinks, does not exist.35 
It is simply wrong to suggest, as proponents of a two-output 
thesis do, “that instrumental concerns should . . . be downgraded 
to mere matters of implementation as if they could be 
quarantined in a subconstitutional category and thus avoid 
infecting the rest of their doctrine with their contingency.”36 
Rather, as Levinson had put it, “constitutional rights are 
inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns. 
Constitutional adjudication is functional not just at the level of 
remedies, but all the way up.”37 
I believe that Hills and Levinson are right in (at least) one 
absolutely crucial respect: the determination of the 
Constitution’s legal meaning or content does not properly occur 
in a fashion that rules out of bounds considerations fairly 
described as prudential, instrumental, functional, or forward-
 
 33. Hills, supra note 8, at 175. 
 34. Levinson, supra note 8, at 858. 
 35. Hills, supra note 8, at 174. 
 36. Id. at 182. 
 37. Levinson, supra note 8, at 873. 
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looking. I am pluralist or eclectic about “interpretation.” But I 
believe that the two conclusions the pragmatists draw from this 
premise are both false. First, it does not follow that all ways of 
conceptualizing divisions within implementation space are 
necessarily useless. Whether a particular carving has any cash 
value for us depends upon the nature of the carving and the 
features or functions of the component pieces. Second, it is not 
constitutive of a division between one stage or output of 
constitutional implementation and a second (whether the dyads 
are termed “interpretation” and “construction,” or “meaning” 
and “implementing doctrine,” or something else) that one of the 
two be relegated to a realm of pure value or principle, or be 
otherwise cordoned off from contingency. Interpretation and 
construction could be made of much the same stuff. 
My responses to the pragmatists’ two objections are 
couched thus far in modal terms. I have asserted that it is 
possible for a two-output theory to avoid the errors on which the 
pragmatists focus. But I can say more. I believe that my 
preferred carving of implementation space—between judicial 
determinations of the Constitution’s legal meaning or effect 
(determinations that I term “constitutional operative 
propositions”) and judicial directives regarding the standards or 
tests courts are to employ in determining whether a given 
constitutional operative proposition is satisfied (directives that I 
term “constitutional decision rules”)—does in fact avoid those 
errors. In short, even if law is determined in ways favored by 
most theorists who lean “pragmatic” or “nonoriginalist,” it is 
nonetheless of pragmatic value to recognize that courts build 
conceptually separate norms, tests, frameworks—in a word, 
doctrine—to implement pragmatically determined law. 
Take an actual case, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.38 The 
case arose after a police officer in Lago Vista, Texas stopped a 
woman, Gail Atwater, for driving without having fastened her 
seatbelt or those of her two young children. Although Officer 
Bart Turek could have simply issued Atwater a citation, he 
arrested and handcuffed her and transported her to the police 
station. Atwater sued the officer, the police chief, and the city, 
arguing that the arrest was an unreasonable seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 38. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The following discussion draws heavily from Berman, 
supra note 3, at 108–13. 
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Four Justices would have upheld Atwater’s claim, reasoning 
that a custodial arrest is a seizure; that the Fourth Amendment 
proscribes “unreasonable seizures”; that whether a given seizure 
is reasonable depends entirely upon the particulars of the 
situation; and that this particular seizure was patently 
unreasonable because legitimate state interests could have been 
served just as well by the simple issuance of a citation.39 Five 
justices disagreed, holding in an opinion by Justice Souter that 
the arrest did not violate Atwater’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
The majority did not say that the officer’s actions were 
reasonable. In fact, it intimated that they were not: “Atwater’s 
claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly 
outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her 
case.”40 But this was not the sort of inquiry the majority wanted 
adjudications of Fourth Amendment cases to turn on, for 
a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served 
by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations 
of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the 
field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review. 
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on 
the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in 
implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw 
standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a 
fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and 
years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to 
strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit 
the government’s side with an essential interest in readily 
administrable rules.41 
In short, the majority wanted a rule not a standard. And the rule 
it announced was this: “If an officer has probable cause to 
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor 
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the 
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”42 
There are at least two ways to make sense of or explain this 
doctrine. We could simply say that that’s the rule or the law, and 
be done with it: it is per se reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment for a police officer to arrest anyone who 
commits any criminal offense under any circumstances, so long 
as the offense occurs in the officer’s presence. Alternatively, we 
 
 39. 532 U.S. at 369–71 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 347. 
 41. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 42. Id. at 354. 
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could interpret (!) the decision as having done two things, not 
one. First, the Atwater majority, like the dissent, interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to provide that a seizure is unconstitutional 
if unreasonable, an inescapably all-things-considered judgment.43 
This would be the “constitutional operative proposition.” 
Second, it crafted a directive—a “constitutional decision rule”—
that courts should conclusively presume a full custodial arrest to 
be reasonable if they conclude (by a preponderance of the 
evidence) that the officer had probable cause to suppose that the 
arrestee had committed any offense in his presence. This 
characterization of the doctrine can explain how Atwater lost, 
even though not a single member of the Court seemed to doubt 
that she had been subjected to an unreasonable seizure. 
I do not care at this juncture to argue that the latter is 
necessarily the better way to reconstruct or reverse engineer or 
conceptualize this particular doctrine. The point of this example 
is only to illustrate the operative proposition/decision rule 
distinction in action and to show how, contrary to the pragmatist 
worry, this particular way to taxonomize implementation space 
is not an exercise in empty or arid conceptualism. Rather, there 
are at least three respects in which the distinction could be 
consequentially meaningful as applied to this single case. 
First, this carving of the decision has different expressive 
significance from the one-output reading and might therefore 
spur different responses by nonjudicial actors. Citizens, 
legislatures, and police departments might develop different 
views about appropriate police behavior, and might produce 
different sorts of regulatory review mechanisms, if they 
understand the Supreme Court to have affirmed that arrests do 
run afoul of a constitutional command unless reasonable all-
things-considered, and to have opted to underenforce this 
particular mandate for institution-specific reasons.  Second, the 
decision-rule characterization is likely to open up more space for 
congressional involvement in the shaping of constitutional 
doctrine. Suppose that Congress disagreed with the Court’s 
predictive judgment about how much well-intentioned police 
 
 43. The Court had previously said precisely this, in rulings that Atwater did not 
purport to overrule. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990) (“[I]n 
order to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is 
generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by 
agents of the government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they always be 
reasonable. . . .  Whether the basis for [arrest] authority exists is the sort of recurring 
factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their 
judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it reasonably.”). 
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behavior the ad hoc, totality of the circumstances approach to 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness would chill, or with the 
Court’s evaluative judgment about how much litigation on the 
matter was excessive. Because one might reasonably conclude 
that Congress’s judgments on these questions should trump 
those of the Court, it is plausible to suppose that announcing the 
Atwater doctrine as a decision rule employing a conclusive 
presumption would be a particularly effective (though not 
essential) way to signal where and how Congress could intervene 
if it so chose. Third and relatedly, characterizing the doctrine as 
a decision rule that implements an operative proposition of 
different content might make it easier for the Court to itself 
revisit the doctrine if appropriate.  When balancing the costs of 
over-deterring police from engaging in reasonable arrests against 
those of under-deterring them from engaging in unreasonable 
ones, the Court expressly observed “a dearth of horribles 
demanding redress.”44 But what if the Court substantially 
underestimated the incidence of unreasonable warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests? Or what if the Court was right at the time 
of its opinion, but facts changed? No doubt the Court could 
revise the doctrine in light of experience regardless of how the 
doctrine were classified. But it is plausible to suppose that the 
competing demands of stability and flexibility might find more 
effective reconciliation in the development of stare decisis 
practices that allow decision rules to be modified or abandoned 
somewhat more readily than operative propositions. 
You might say that we don’t need the operative 
proposition/decision rule distinction to achieve any of these 
ends, and you’d be right. But whether this conceptualization 
produces real-world effects that competing conceptualizations 
could not is the wrong standard for assessment. Pragmatically 
speaking, the question is closer to whether there is a realistic 
probability that some things in the world would go differently if 
our conceptual toolbox allows us to distinguish judicial 
statements about what courts take the Constitution to permit, 
authorize or prohibit—what courts interpret the law to be—from 
judge-made rules regarding how courts will adjudicate claims of 
conformity and non-conformity with what the Constitution 
permits, authorizes, or prohibits. It seems plain that the answer 
to that question is “yes.” 
 
 44. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353. 
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What, now, about the pragmatists’ second objection—that a 
two-part conceptualization along the foregoing lines implies 
(mistakenly) that interpretation is all about pure principles or 
values or original meanings or, in any event, nothing messy, 
instrumental or contingent? Conceivably, our analysis of Atwater 
lends support to that concern. That, however, would be the 
wrong lesson to draw. 
Happily, I can substantiate this claim much more quickly, 
with just one example. Six years ago, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,45 all 
members of the Court agreed that the Constitution prohibits 
excessive partisanship in redistricting. But the Court fragmented 
when it came to deciding what to do about it. A four-Justice 
plurality, concluding that it was impossible to craft a judicially 
manageable standard, would have held that claims of excessive 
partisanship in redistricting raise a nonjusticiable political 
question; four others would have embraced three different tests; 
Justice Kennedy couldn’t come up with a test he thought 
appropriate and workable, but also refused yet to conclude, with 
the plurality, that the effort should be abandoned. I have argued 
elsewhere that the Court should have recognized that only the 
decision rule, not the operative proposition, need be “judicially 
manageable,” and I offered some suggestions regarding what 
sensible decision rules might look like.46 For instance, I proposed 
that courts should conclude that a redistricting was excessively 
partisan, in violation of the Constitution, if (but not “only if”) 
undertaken mid-decade by a single-party-controlled state 
government unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest. 
Maybe this would be a wise decision rule, maybe not. My 
present point is only that there is no reason to believe that the 
operative proposition I am attributing to Vieth (and that I am 
disposed to endorse)—that excessive partisanship in redistricting 
is unconstitutional—must be reached in a manner blind to 
messy, contingent facts about partisan politics in contemporary 
America. I meant to signal that such facts may properly bear on 
an operative proposition—that operative propositions need not 
be reduced to “‘pure’ noninstrumental constitutional value”47—
by labeling them propositions rather than principles. And my 
 
 45. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 46. See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781 
(2005). For a similar conclusion, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). 
 47. Hills, supra note 8, at 174. 
!!!BERMAN-271-CONSTLCONSTRUCTIONSANDCONSTLDECISIONRULES.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/23/2010  2:38 PM 
2010] CARVING OF IMPLEMENTATION SPACE 67 
 
strong suspicion is that practical contingencies did in fact 
influence the conclusions of at least some members of the Court 
that excessive partisanship in redistricting is unconstitutional. 
(Really, how could they not have?) Surely the Justices didn’t all 
rely on the original meaning of some portion of constitutional 
text given that most haven’t even located where in the 
Constitution this command resides. 
Here, to summarize, is one way to flesh out the 
interpretation/construction distinction: Interpretation is the 
determination, by means of a raft of argumentative modalities, 
of the Constitution’s “operative propositions”—what the 
Constitution “means,” or what its legal significance or effect is. 
Construction is the crafting of a variety of rules designed 
particularly for use in constitutional adjudication, chief among 
them being “decision rules” that direct courts in determining 
whether to hold that a challenged action is or is not 
constitutional. This particular way to carve implementation 
space is rooted in the single idea that sometimes the judiciary 
will want to say something like “the law is X, but courts will 
strike down a challenged provision even if Y (or will uphold the 
provision so long as Z)”—or that even when the judiciary 
doesn’t want to put things that way, the rest of us might have 
good reason to understand what it has said in such terms. 
Perhaps this is not, at the end of the day, a good 
conceptualization of implementation space because, say, it is 
insufficiently faithful to existing practice or is less useful than are 
competing conceptualizations. But it is not a sound objection to 
this framework that it commits us to an anti-pragmatic view of 
interpretation. It does no such thing. Very likely, the prevailing 
articulation of the interpretation/construction distinction helps 
nourish that misunderstanding by emphasizing that these are 
different “activities.” We might do better by foregrounding that 
implementation can yield different types of outputs, 
distinguishable by reference to the functions they serve, and not 
necessarily by the argumentative considerations upon which they 
rely. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional theorists have been carving the space of 
constitutional implementation for generations now. In recent 
years, several talented and industrious theorists have coalesced 
in support of one particular carving: a carving that distinguishes 
the interpretation of the Constitution’s “linguistic content” or 
!!!BERMAN-271-CONSTLCONSTRUCTIONSANDCONSTLDECISIONRULES.DOC  12/23/2010  2:38 PM 
68 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:39 
 
“semantic meaning” from the construction of legal doctrine 
designed to apply that meaning. Proponents of this 
conceptualization have been motivated, by and large, by the 
beliefs (a) that (putting judicial precedent aside) what the law is 
just is the semantic meaning of a legal text and that this meaning 
is fixed at the text’s issuance, and (b) that judges’ proper role in 
constitutional adjudication is not limited to determining what the 
law is. 
I have argued that this package—the “new originalist” 
package—is unappealing because the core originalist claim that 
the Constitution’s legal content, meaning, significance or effect is 
fixed is mistaken. But even I’m right about that, that does not 
yet establish that the interpretation/construction distinction is 
valueless. Perhaps the new originalists’ conceptualization of 
implementation space is still useful even if we reject their 
objectionable claim that the Constitution’s legal meaning is 
fixed. 
If the (fixed) semantic or linguistic meaning or content of 
some portion of the Constitution is not always identical to its 
(possibly dynamic) legal meaning, effect or significance, then we 
might distinguish between “linguistic” interpretation—the 
attempt to determine the former—and “legal” interpretation—
the attempt to determine the latter. And we might then ask 
which of these two types of interpretation is captured, in the 
proposed two-part distinction between interpretation and 
construction, by interpretation, simpliciter.  Much contemporary 
discussion of the interpretation/construction distinction suggests 
to me that interpretation is thought always and necessarily to be 
the attempt to determine fixed semantic or linguistic meaning. 
Construed in that fashion, the interpretation/construction 
distinction is not, I think, perspicuous. 
But what if, at the fork in the road, we pursue the other 
path, distinguishing between the determination of what the 
Constitution means in the sense of what the law is 
(“interpretation”) and the making of rules particularly designed 
for applying or enforcing that meaning or law in the crucible of 
adjudication (“construction”)? That take on the 
interpretation/construction distinction seems pretty sensible to 
me. Some of the rules for adjudication will be rules that tell 
courts what to do once they have determined that a 
constitutional violation has occurred. These will be constructed 
“remedial rules.” Much more of the constructed adjudicatory 
doctrine, however, will direct courts how to determine whether 
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there has been a violation in the first place. These rules are 
constitutional decision rules.  Whether we choose to say that 
they are produced as an exercise in “constitutional construction” 
is, I think, a matter of little importance. 
